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 Rhetoric within narratives has been the focus of attention for several well-known 
 scholars in the field of literary criticism. While other forms of writing, such as 
 professional reports, have been analysed through the lens of narrative, the rhetoric 
 therein has received little attention. Although the official position is that UK child 
 protection proceedings are inquisitorial and evidence-based, it is possible to identify 
 rhetorical practices in both narratives of professional reports and the court 
 proceedings. Drawing on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, I will analyse rhetorically the expert 
 pediatric reports presented in a case of alleged Munchausen syndrome by proxy, 
 focusing in particular on ethos and pathos. In so doing, I will seek to illustrate how 
 rhetoric permeates child protection proceedings and indicate how rhetorical analysis 





 While it is claimed that narrative cuts across disciplines and opens up 
the social sciences to literary theory (Gergen, cited in Segal, 2005, p.61), the 
study of narrative rhetoric as found in the works of Booth (1961), Chatman 
(1978), and Phelan (1996) does not seem to have yet made that transition. An 
exception to this is Hall’s (1997) study of social work as a storytelling and 
persuasive activity and it is on this I hope to build in this article. Narrative 
rhetoric, according to Bartlett and Wilson (1982), is concerned with syntactic 
structures and vocabulary, temporal organization, causal structure, narrative 
voice, and level of explicit detail. In this paper I am concerned primarily with 
narrative voice as it pertains to the ethos of the author and is addressed to a 
particular audience: that is, with a specific configuration of rhetorical 
techniques as they are found in one pediatrician’s reports prepared for UK child 
protection proceedings concerning a case of alleged Munchausen syndrome by 
proxy (MSbP). While this paper focuses on the reports of one pediatrician in a 
single case of alleged MSbP, the analysis that frames the paper emerges out of a 
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study of a number of such cases in both the UK and the US. The case I draw 
upon here is useful heuristically and can serve as an exemplar of the processes 
identified in other cases. It is worth noting at the outset that while this paper 
deals with rhetoric in cases of alleged MSbP, the analysis here may well be 
applicable across other areas of alleged child abuse. 
 Section one will provide some brief background information regarding 
MSbP in general and the case to which the reports I examine relate. In section 
two, I raise some general points about rhetoric before embarking on an analysis 
of ethotic rhetoric and pathos in sections three and four respectively. In 
conclusion, I will offer some commentary on the role of rhetoric in the analysis 
of expert reports. 
 
1. MSbP and the Case of P,C,&S vs United Kingdom 
 Munchausen syndrome by proxy (MSbP) is generally thought of as a 
form of child abuse in which the mother fabricates or induces illness in her 
child(ren) in order to seek medical attention. The harm done to the child might 
be as a direct result of the fabrication or inducement, say in the case of 
poisoning, and/or indirectly at the hands of medical practitioners treating the 
child unnecessarily. Since its genesis by Meadow (1977) to describe two cases 
of alleged salt poisoning, clear indicators and perpetrator characteristics have 
been identified.  
 MSbP, however, is a much contested concept. Its proponents claim that 
it is a valid diagnostic category with a respectable history that has saved the 
lives of many children over the years (see Wilson, 2001). There is a significant 
literature that describes different manifestations of the phenomenon and there 
have been some attempts at explanatory hypotheses (see, for example, Schreier 
& Libow, 1993). In the UK, MSbP has been accepted as a valid diagnosis in 
family and criminal legal proceedings and has found its way into governmental 
guidance on child protection (Department of Health, 1999). On the other side of 
the debate there are respectable authors—pediatricians, psychiatrists, lawyers, 
psychologists, social workers, and academics—who question the validity of 
MSbP, pointing out that it is conceptually confused, empirically flawed, and 
operationally questionable (for example, Baldwin, 1996; Mart, 1999; and 
Morley, 1995). Such authors point to the numerous different definitions of 
MSbP; the lack of agreement amongst the medical community as to whether it 
is really a syndrome or whether it is a psychiatric diagnosis of the perpetrator or 
a pediatric diagnosis of the child; the unproven and potentially un-provable 
nature of the theory; vague and contradictory indicators; wide, all-embracing, 
and gender biased perpetrator indicators and practices; the lack of scientific 
rigour; the rejection of MSbP in courts in the US, Australia, and the UK as 
lacking evidentiary probity; questionable practices by some of the proponents 
of MSbP; the increasing number of miscarriages of justice; bias within the 
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system of child protection in the UK; and the fact that after over 30 years, the 
term has still not been included into either the World Health Organisation’s 
International Classification of Diseases or the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (for a summary of and 
reference to these, see Baldwin, 2005). 
 What can be gleaned from these debates and the records in individual 
cases is that MSbP is regarded as a complex phenomenon that stirs strong 
emotions and in which both sides view the stakes as high. For those diagnosing 
MSbP, the issue is the very serious one of protecting children from harm if not 
death; for those opposing the diagnosis, either by claiming that MSbP is not 
applicable in any particular case or is not in general a valid diagnostic category, 
the stakes are the unnecessary breakup of families through miscarriages of 
justice either in the family or the criminal courts. 
 The case of P,C,&S
2
 arose against such a contentious background. This 
case involved allegations by Rochdale Social Services in the UK that the 
mother, P, had been found guilty previously of MSbP abuse on her second son 
(in the US) and that she was repeating her abusive behaviour with her unborn 
child, S, now that she was living in the UK. The child was removed from the 
parents shortly after birth and there followed protracted legal proceedings. 
During the final hearings, which lasted approximately four weeks, P was left 
legally unrepresented following the departure of her solicitor when the judge, 
Justice Wall, refused a short adjournment for her to find further legal counsel. 
During the proceedings, P made frequent reference to what she saw as a 
violation of her human rights (to be legally represented), but these appeals went 
unheeded. Consequently, P had to conduct her own case in the face of 
experienced and senior legal representation on the part of the Local Authority 
and the Guardian ad litem, both of whom were arguing for the permanent 
adoption of S.  
 Key to these proceedings were the expert reports of the pediatrician (the 
reports with which this paper is concerned) and the psychiatrist who, basing his 
view on the report of the pediatrician, recommended immediate and permanent 
adoption. The pediatrician’s reports were thus central to the argument being 
made by the Local Authority and the Guardian ad litem that S be removed and 
adopted outside of the biological family.  
 Finally, S was freed for adoption and the judge refused leave to appeal. 
The parents, again legally unrepresented, made an appeal to the Appeal Court 
but this was rejected. The parents then took the case, this time represented pro 
bono, to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which ruled that the 
domestic proceedings had violated the parents’ rights under the right to family 
life and the right to a fair hearing and the child’s rights under the right to family 
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life. In making this ruling, the ECHR stated that the child had been removed 
“without relevant and sufficient reason,” that the action taken by the Local 
Authority was “draconian” and “unnecessary to protect the child,” and that the 
ECHR could not rule out a different outcome had the domestic hearings been 
conducted properly. The UK government was directed to pay costs and 
reparation to the parents. The child was not returned to the parents, however, 
because the Local Authority, refusing to await the outcome of the ECHR 
proceedings, had proceeded with the adoption and under UK law there is no 
means by which to undo this. 
 
2. Rhetoric 
 Before embarking on my analysis of the reports under consideration, a 
few introductory remarks about rhetoric are in order. 
 First, rhetoric is the art of suasion. The term is often used, albeit 
misleadingly, in opposition to the term reality, implying that what is claimed by 
the rhetoric is either untrue or does not live up to what is “true” or “real.” 
Hence, numerous texts claim to explore and analyse “rhetoric and reality” or 
the “reality behind the rhetoric.” What the authors of such texts often miss is 
that rhetoric is an integral part of the truth- or reality-making process. Rhetoric, 
as the art of suasion—either per-suasion or dis-suasion—is found as much in 
ostensibly objective, scientific texts as it is in political speeches, where one 
might expect to find it. Indeed, Booth (1961) states that an “author cannot 
choose to avoid rhetoric; he can only choose the kind of rhetoric he will 
employ” (p.149). The techniques used in different spheres might be different; 
the art, however, is the same. Each seeks to persuade the reader that what is 
being presented is plausible, efficacious, or, preferably, true.  
 According to Aristotle (n.d.), there are three purposes of rhetoric: 
epideictic, deliberative, and forensic. Epideictic rhetoric is concerned with 
praise and blame and is often found in funeral orations, obituaries, graduation 
speeches, and the like. Deliberative rhetoric attempts to persuade others towards 
(or away from) a particular course of action. Forensic rhetoric concerns itself 
with guilt and innocence pertaining to past actions. In child protection 
proceedings, often all three forms of rhetoric are mobilised: some guilt or 
innocence regarding past actions (e.g. harm to a child) is established, a 
perpetrator is often characterised in a negative fashion (that is, established as 
blameworthy), and a course of action is determined upon (a care plan is 
established).  
 According to Aristotle (n.d.), there are three means of persuasion: ethos, 
pathos, and logos. Ethos pertains to the credibility, authority, worthiness, and 
intent of the speaker. Pathos refers to persuasion by means of appeal to the 
emotions of one’s readers (though this might be extended to include appeal also 
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to the pre-dispositions, self-interest, and/or identity of one’s readers). Logos is 
persuasion by inductive or deductive reasoning, evidence, and the marshalling 
of support for one’s argument. In terms of taxis or structure, the classical view 
of argumentation involved the exordium, in which the speaker would attempt to 
establish her/himself before the audience; the narration, or case outline, 
presenting supporting examples or evidence; the confutation or refutation, 
where the speaker would attempt to pre-empt or deal with arguments that might 
be raised by way of challenge; and the conclusio or peroration, in which the 
speaker would gracefully withdraw (see Nash, 1989). In this paper I will 
confine my analysis to that of ethos and pathos as these are generally 
overlooked aspects in discussions concerning the trustworthiness of evidence in 
child protection proceedings, which are based, supposedly, primarily on 
evidence and argument, that is, in Aristotle’s terms, logos. Given my focus 
herein, most of the discussion will centre on the exordium and peroratio within 
the pediatrician’s reports, although some examples of ethos and pathos are 
found elsewhere in the reports and these will be drawn upon where relevant. 
 Second, when considering ethos and pathos as rhetorical techniques it is 
important to note that each can be realised both positively and negatively: for 
example, one can present oneself as credible while also positioning one’s 
opponent as lacking credibility; and one can appeal to one’s readers’ positive 
emotions toward oneself while fostering negative emotions toward one’s 
opponents. The important thing to remember is that while negative techniques 
can be used to undermine the persuasiveness of the argument of one’s opponent 
and thus make one’s own argument seem, in contrast, more persuasive, 
negative techniques do not in and of themselves add to the correctness of one’s 
own argument. We shall see, for example, occurrences of negative ethos being 
applied to the mother, thus avoiding the necessity to deal with the challenges to 
the pediatrician’s use and interpretation of the medical evidence raised by the 
mother’s analysis. 
 Third, the application of rhetoric does not necessarily imply or involve 
the deliberate manipulation of others into believing something that the author 
does not believe to be true, whether by fabrication, misrepresentation, or 
falsification of evidence, though, of course it may. In what follows I will 
assume for the sake of argument that the pediatrician believed genuinely in the 
evidence and findings presented in her/his reports. The reports thus served the 
dual purposes of serving the court in its deliberations and contributing to the 
protection of a child that the pediatrician believed to be at risk. Whatever 
rhetorical features and techniques we might identify through the analysis here 
that might question the pediatrician’s presentation and interpretation of the 
material should be understood in that context. Similarly, while I might argue 
that certain aspects of the pediatrician’s authorship served to enhance unduly 
the persuasiveness of the report, I am not suggesting in any way that the 
pediatrician was deliberately engaging in rhetorical trickery so to do. 




Furthermore, the analysis presented here is independent of whether one accepts 
or rejects the opinion of the pediatrician as to whether the case in question was 
one of MSbP. 
 
3. Ethotic Rhetoric 
 In this section I will explore the ethotic rhetoric of the reports. Section 
a) will discuss the positive ethotic rhetoric pertaining to the pediatrician 
her/himself, Section b) the negative ethotic rhetoric applied to the mother. 
 
a) Ethotic Rhetoric in the Presentation of Self 
 It is primarily in the preamble that the pediatrician seeks to establish 
credibility and thus acceptability before her/his audience, that is, the court. This 
is done, as is the case with all expert reports, through noting relevant 
occupational positions, qualifications, clinical and academic activities, and 
professional memberships. By demonstrating the respect in which s/he is held 
by her/his community of peers (for example, through membership in the Royal 
College of Pediatricians and Child Health, positions of authority in child 
protection structures, and the refereeing of articles for a prestigious journal), the 
pediatrician seeks to establish her/his credentials and authority to speak of the 
matter before the court. None of this is contentious or unsurprising—indeed it is 
what is expected. All of these claims to authority are external and verifiable. In 
this case, however, the pediatrician goes slightly further to include information 
that might serve as bolstering this claim to authority by inference and 
association but which is also less verifiable and more open to challenge, namely 
the claim of having: 
 
 read over 300 articles and the three scientific books on the subject; 
 engaged in research and publication of major articles on the subject (in 
collaboration with notable figures as identifiable via the references 
supplied at the end of the report); 
 submitted an MD thesis; and  
 acted as an expert witness in around 20 cases, usually on behalf of the 
Guardian ad Litem (GaL).  
 The inferences intended for the audience to draw from these statements, 
I contend, were that the pediatrician was well-read, at the forefront of the area, 
had undertaken work of sufficient quality to be awarded a higher degree, and 
had acted previously in the same capacity in which s/he was being asked to act 
currently by the GaL. While not necessarily unreasonable inferences, the point 
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here is that there is nothing inherent in these statements warranting the positive 
connotations of those inferences. Let us take each in turn. 
 With regard to the pediatrician’s reading of the subject, there is nothing 
in the statement that inherently implies that the pediatrician had understood all, 
many, or indeed any of these articles, or whether s/he had critically evaluated 
these as to their worth. Similarly, there is nothing in the claim to collaborative 
research that indicates the quality of that research, though the adjective “major” 
applied to the pediatrician’s articles implies that these were high-quality and 
important articles. Further, the reference to the submission of an MD thesis 
carries no inherent indication of quality—as the thesis had not at that point been 
examined and might have been rejected (indeed a significant number of such 
theses are rejected). Finally, the statement as to previous experience in the 
capacity of expert carries no indication of quality and no information as to 
whether the reports had been accepted or rejected. Now, it may be that all of 
these statements do reflect aspects of the pediatrician’s activities that support 
her/his claim to being a credible expert witness. The point here is that all the 
positive connotations that these statements carry with them serve a rhetorical 
function in enhancing the ethos of the pediatrician. In other words, the 
persuasiveness of the statements relies upon the inferences made by the 
audience. 
 The problem with relying on the audience to make inferences is that of 
indeterminacy; inferences are not determined by the original statement and as 
such the audience may make inferences other than the preferred ones. For 
example, the positive connotations associated with authorship of two “major” 
articles might be undermined by knowledge of the heavy criticism that at least 
one of those articles received, criticism that identified methodological 
problems, problems of interpretation, and lack of clarity in presentation of 
findings.
3
 Similarly, the statement that the pediatrician had previously acted as 
expert in around 20 cases without further detail might be inferred as masking a 
high error rate, especially since the pediatrician was specifically instructed to 
state her/his error rate in such cases but avoided so doing. If these alternative 
claims and inferences are themselves persuasive this would impact negatively 
on the pediatrician’s credibility in two ways: first, that the claims themselves do 
not support the claim to credibility; second, and perhaps potentially more 
damaging, by making unsupported or debatable claims, the pediatrician, in 
her/his authoring of the report, might be seen as exaggerating her/his expertise 
or, perhaps worse, misrepresenting her/himself to the court.  
 The rhetorical strategy of relying on the audience to make the preferred 
inferences thus may appear to be a risky one, not because the pediatrician is 
                                               
3 In this context it is interesting to note that the data on which one of these articles was based 
was accidentally shredded and thus there is no means by which to assess the data, the quality of 
the research process, or the validity of the interpretation of findings. 




deliberately deceiving her/his audience and may be “found out,” but because  
inferences are simply that, inferences, and as such can be challenged by claims 
that cast doubt on the preferred inferences (as indicated above). At this point, it 
is important to remember the context in which such rhetorical techniques 
operate. 
 First of all, there is the ideological perception of professionals as 
generally benevolent and benign (see Ingleby, 1985). It is possible to see this 
ideology at work in the case of P,C,&S through examining the approach of the 




 With regard to the pediatrician, the judge stated that s/he “… began 
[her/his] assessment of the medical records by hoping that the case against 
factitious illness would not be made out” (my emphasis) and referred to her/him 
as having gone to some effort to find in favour of the mother rather than come 
reluctantly to the conclusion that this was a case of MSbP and that the child 
should, in all probability, be removed from the birth parents. This view 
expressed by the judge was subsequent to his dismissing each and every 
allegation made by the pediatrician regarding the mother’s behaviour towards 
the index child (that is, the child subject to this case, S), thus partially 
undermining the pediatrician’s argument about a continuing pattern of 
behaviour; dismissing each and every allegation made against the mother 
regarding her own health behaviour while in the UK; and not mentioning 
anything regarding the mother’s behaviour in relation to her first child. So 
despite ruling against the pediatrician’s interpretation and representation of the 
evidence, the judge still claimed that the pediatrician had acted with a bias of 
goodwill toward the mother, rather than come to the (in some ways more 
consistent and logical, though harsher) conclusion that the pediatrician had 
become, in Phelan’s (2007) terminology, an unreliable narrator in reporting, 
interpreting, and evaluating the evidence. This apparent inconsistency can, I 
think, be explained by the fact that to have taken that step would have 
undermined the judge’s own rhetorical project as the pediatrician’s reports 
formed much of the argument for the removal of the child from her biological 
parents. 
 A similar attitude can be detected in the judge’s comments about the 
behaviour of the Social Services. Near to the beginning of the case, the Social 
Services required the parents to attend a psychiatric consultation with their 
chosen MSbP expert. The subsequent report, though critical of the parents, did 
not rule out the possibility of working with the family, and indicated the 
expert’s willingness to be involved with the case. The Social Services did not 
                                               
4 Again, I am not implying that Justice Nicholas Wall was deliberately manipulating the 
situation in any way—merely that his actions can be seen as embodying the ideological (and 
common) perception of professions as benevolent and benign. 
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disclose this report, despite being asked to do so on a number of occasions, for 
several months, by which time they had insisted that the parents attend a second 
evaluation with another MSbP expert, whose report was more negative and 
more in line with the Social Services’ already established view that this was a 
case of MSbP.
5
 In addressing this issue in his judgment, Justice Wall stated that 
the Social Services could only be criticised for giving to the parents a stick with 
which they could beat the Social Services. In other words, the deliberate non-
disclosure of this key document was presented as a mistake (because of the 
parents’ hostile reactions) rather than any maleficence or unprofessional 
behaviour on the part of the Social Services.  
 These two examples are substantive enough to suggest, I think, that the 
prevailing attitude of the court was that the professionals involved were 
generally benevolent and benign in their actions—the pediatrician attempting to 
find in favour of the mother and the Social Services not attempting to interfere 
with due process and the examination of all the evidence. 
 A second feature of the context into which the pediatrician submitted 
her/his report was Justice Wall’s own position on expert witnesses, one which 
granted such witnesses a great deal of deference. In 1997, Justice Wall wrote 
that expert witnesses should be accorded “courtesy and respect by judges” and 
protected from “cross examination which is hostile, discourteous, or personal.” 
Indeed, the mother was prevented from asking certain questions in cross-




 Within this context it is reasonable to suppose that the inferences invited 
by the gaps in the pediatrician’s preamble would be filled positively rather than 
negatively, and in so doing, any awkward questioning of those gaps might be 
averted.  
 Finally, it is worth noting that positive rhetoric is not limited to the 
preamble. In two other places, the pediatrician counters challenges to her/his 
expertise and on a number of occasions s/he presents herself as being careful, 
reasonable, fair-minded, and cautious in making her/his diagnosis of MSbP, a 
diagnosis that might have very significant consequences for the family.  
 With respect to the first of these, the mother made two challenges to the 
expertise of the pediatrician. The first of these was on the basis that s/he was 
not a specialist in gastroenterology and given the focus on the 
gastroenterological symptoms of the second US child, the UK pediatrician was 
                                               
5 That the Social Services had already determined that this was a case of MSbP is indicated by 
their numerous attempts to argue estoppel, i.e., that the case had already been determined in the 
US and that it was unnecessary to re-argue the evidence, the only issue being that of disposal. 
6 The reports were also submitted to a very favourably inclined audience in the Social Services 
(see later under the discussion of pathos). I have reserved discussion of this contextual element 
as it seems to fit better alongside the discussion of alignment and asymmetry, though of course 
it has relevance at this point also.  




not best placed to interpret the medical records. The pediatrician responded by 
claiming that the case did not require a gastroenterological specialist but a more 
generalist evaluation and hence s/he had the necessary expertise to evaluate the 
medical records. By redefining the problem—from a gastroenterological 
condition to one of suspected MSbP—the pediatrician was able to reclaim 
her/his expertise. The second challenge concerned the test for phenolphthalein, 
which was interpreted as evidence of laxative abuse. The mother presented 
evidence and testimony of experts to the effect that the single positive test was 
unreliable—the test was not undertaken properly, was not repeated as per 
protocol, that there were many hundreds of substances that produce a false 
positive on this test. The pediatrician, acknowledging that toxicology was not 
her/his field of expertise, nevertheless recuperated this challenge by arguing 
that the toxicologist was “… not best placed to weigh up a complex child 
protection case such as this. To do so requires a working knowledge of 
pediatrics spanning the different specialities” and that the case involved, “a 
difficult process of weighing up various possible risks to come to a conclusion 
about the welfare of a child, and this would not have been within his expertise.” 
In other words, the pediatrician attempted, by side-stepping the issue of test 
reliability, to question the expertise of the toxicologist regarding the clinical 
significance of the test result (negative ethotic rhetoric) and re-establish the 
pediatrician’s expertise over the toxicological evidence (positive ethotic 
rhetoric). 
 Elsewhere in the report there are other examples of positive self-
representation (that is, positive ethotic rhetoric). For example, in 
acknowledging that there are differences between the UK and the US in respect 
of infectious diseases the pediatrician writes: “and I have attempted to bear this 
in mind also. I am confident that these issues would not prevent me from 
forming a reasoned opinion in this case.” Here the pediatrician is presenting 
her/himself as thoughtful through the consideration of what might be thought to 
be confounding factors but able to come to a “reasoned” opinion. Similarly, in 
the fourth report, the pediatrician presents her/himself as not making a 
diagnosis on the basis of a perpetrator profile (one of the significant criticisms 
of the operationalization of the diagnosis of MSbP) thus distancing her/himself 
from the poor practice of doing so. Later on in that report, in responding to a 
challenge made by the mother, the pediatrician states: “I have presented 
examples which illustrate the evolution of this case. This is not rhetorical or 
prejudicial, merely an attempt to clarify how and why I came to my opinion. If 
the medical evidence had not supported a diagnosis of child abuse I would have 
said so.” Again, the pediatrician is at pains to emphasise that her/his diagnosis 
is not the result of anything other than what the evidence reveals and that no 
personal bias should be attributed to her/him. And on the same page, s/he 
implies goodwill, helpfulness, and commitment by stating that by providing 
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“referenced rough notes,” “I think I have gone beyond my basic remit which 
was to provide an opinion.”  
 Finally, the pediatrician withdraws (the conclusion) by indicating her 
humility before the court: “My personal opinion, humbly but strongly felt ….”  
Thus we have seen the range of rhetorical techniques utilised in the self-
presentation of the pediatrician in establishing her/his credibility, authority, 
worthiness, and intent. The other side to ethotic rhetoric is the presentation of 
one’s opponent, in this case the mother, and it is this to which we now turn. 
 
b) Ethotic Rhetoric and the Presentation of One’s Opponent 
 It is important to note at the beginning of this discussion that negative 
ethotic rhetoric is fundamental to the diagnosis of MSbP; that is, the diagnosis 
of MSbP is based on establishing that the mother has acted deceitfully and 
dangerously, in a way that has harmed her child. Other characteristics, though 
not necessarily fundamental to the diagnosis, that are linked with MSbP are 
manipulation of others, antagonism towards professionals, litigiousness, 
relationship and employment difficulties, and denial (see, for example, 
Baldwin, 1996). As such, the whole diagnostic process could be seen as an 
exercise in ethotic rhetoric: that is, arguing that the mother lacks credibility (in 
her account of events); authority (in that her account carries less weight than 
that of documentary evidence); worthiness (in that discrepancies are interpreted 
as being the result of the mother’s deceitfulness); and intent (in that the mother 
intends harm to the child). As such, it has many features in common with other 
rhetorical disorders (see Chesebro, 1982, on illness as a rhetorical act; Segal, 
2005, for a discussion of hypochondria as a rhetorical disorder; and Segal, 
2007, on illness as argumentation in contestable disorders). 
 Here, however, I will attempt to separate the rhetorical act of the 
diagnosis of MSbP from the specific rhetorical techniques found in the 
pediatrician’s reports that adversely reflect upon the mother’s credibility as a 
speaker about (rather than within) the events under discussion. There are a 
number of occasions where the pediatrician states or implies that the mother’s 
character is such that the audience should be cautious in accepting her 
statements as valid or at face value. These have little, if anything to do with the 
diagnosis per se, but can be seen as having the result (and perhaps the intention) 
of undermining the ethos of the mother. 
 On two occasions in the main report, the pediatrician makes reference to 
what s/he believes to be “customary” in cases such as these (i.e., cases of 
MSbP). In the first, s/he says, “It is customary in these cases for the alleged 
perpetrator of their legal representative to break down the alleged abuse into its 
component parts and attempt to ‘shout down’ the evidence piece by piece. This 
is illustrated here.” In the second, s/he states, “It is customary for the parent or 
their legal representative to attempt to limit the analysis of the medical history 




to the index child only …. This is illustrated here.” There are two rhetorical 
techniques at play here. The first is the presentation of the mother’s actions 
within a customary context that links her actions with those of other alleged 
perpetrators. No evidence is presented as to the veracity or reliability of the 
pediatrician’s claim that this behaviour is, in fact, customary, and the 
pediatrician makes no statement as to how many of these alleged perpetrators 
were able to establish their innocence in this way. By the pediatrician’s linking 
the mother with a negatively evaluated customary context, the reader is left to 
infer that the mother is somehow doing something that is untoward—an 
undermining of credibility by association. 
 The second rhetorical technique is in the very framing of these actions 
in the context of MSbP rather than in legal discourse. The full rhetorical effect 
can be illustrated by comparing what stands as due process under the law with 
the pediatrician’s claims. Twining (1990), in discussing the rationalist model of 
adjudication, states that:  
 
The direct end of adjective law is rectitude of decision through correct 
application of valid substantive laws … and through accurate 
determination of the true past facts material to precisely specified 
allegations expressed in categories defined in advance by law (i.e., facts 
in issue) proved to specified standards of probability or likelihood on 
the basis of the careful and rational weighing of evidence which is both 
relevant and reliable, presented in a form designed to bring out the truth 
and discover untruth, to supposedly competent and impartial 
decisionmakers, with adequate safeguards against corruption and 
mistake and adequate provision for review and appeal. (pp. 72-73) 
 
 In this context, the mother’s arguments can be seen as perfectly 
legitimate—by questioning individual events (the evidence), she could be seen 
as attempting to “accurately determine true past facts,” for if indeed the child in 
the US was ill on the occasions under discussion, the “pattern” so frequently 
referred to by the pediatrician would break down. She could also be seen as 
addressing “precisely specified allegations”—i.e., the allegations of 
administration of laxatives on identifiable occasions and contributing to the 
“careful and rational weighing” of “relevant and reliable” evidence (for 
example, by ensuring proper examination of the documentary evidence and by 
focusing on the index child). 
 Within this legal framework, the arguments presented by the mother 
appear in a far more positive light than when framed within that of MSbP. My 
argument here is thus not about the merits of the mother’s arguments but about 
the framing of these within one discourse rather than another. The choice of 
context is thus a rhetorical technique focusing on the ethos of the mother rather 
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than the arguments being presented by the mother (for a discussion of rhetoric 
in context, see Linstead, 2001). 
 
4. Pathos 
 Ethotic rhetoric concerns itself with the speaker her/himself. Pathos 
turns towards the audience and addresses in particular how the speaker seeks to 
persuade the audience through appeal to emotion, pre-disposition, self-interest, 
and/or identity. In this, such rhetoric can be seen as both within and 
contributing to what Bachrach and Baratz (1970) call the “mobilization of 
bias,” that is, “a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional 
procedures … that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of 
certain persons and groups at the expense of others. Those who benefit are 
placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests” (p. 
44).  
 Three forms of pathos can be identified within the pediatrician’s report: 
first, the general rhetorical approach of kairology, or timeliness and fit; second, 
the alignment of the pediatrician’s narrative with the predisposition and 
interests of the Social Services; third, asymmetrical approach to evidence and 




The term kairology refers to “the principle of contingency and fitness-to-
situation. Arguments are persuasive, said the Sophists, early rhetoricians, when 
they aptly meet conditions of time, place, and audience; arguments have a 
quality of truth in those situations” (Segal, 2005, p. 22, emphasis in original). 
The first kairotic act, repeated in the second report, is the signed cover sheet by 
the pediatrician claiming that her/his statement “is true to the best of my 
knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I 
shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I 
know to be false or do not believe to be true.” While this is a legal necessity, it 
is nonetheless a rhetorical act, for without it the statement would not fit the 
conditions of legal proceedings, or the audiences of the Social Services and the 
court who were seeking a reliable basis for their decision-making. This kairotic 
act is then supported by the pediatrician’s signature on each page of each report.  
In this statement, also, space is prepared to allow the pediatrician the possibility 
of stating as fact things that s/he “believes to be true” whether or not s/he 
actually verified these. For example, the social worker had indicated in her 
report that the mother had fabricated the events of a house fire and that she, the 
mother, had suffered severe loss of blood. The pediatrician repeated these 
unsubstantiated incidents in her/his report without checking the veracity of 




either. If challenged, her/his argument would merely have to be that s/he 
believed these to be true, not that she had actually checked the truth of the 
statements, thus allowing her/him to present as fact events that were in actuality 
fabricated. 
 Another aspect of kairos appears in the general assumptions of the 
report, such as what constitutes acceptable/unacceptable illness-seeking 
behaviour; that conditions are best understood as having a single explanation 
(the concept of mono-causality); and validity and reliability of MSbP as a 
diagnostic category. At various points in her/his reports, the pediatrician refers 
to the mother’s behaviour in ways that explicitly or implicitly contrast with the 
requirements of the sick role, namely the lack of direct responsibility for being 
sick, the requirement to try to get well and not to prolong the period of sickness, 
and the requirement to comply with competent help (see Parsons, 1951, for a 
discussion of the sick role). In the reports the mother is presented as being 
directly responsible for her child’s illness through, for example, the 
administration of laxatives or reporting long lists of allergies; for extending 
periods of sickness by extending the list of conditions in her reports of her 
child’s symptoms; and for refusing to comply with medical advice, for 
example, over admission to hospital shortly prior to the birth of the index child. 
These assumptions are kairotic in that they help fit the reports to prevailing 
normative attitudes. 
 Similarly, the emphasis on mono-causality in the reports reflects the 
Western medical model practice of discrete etiology and differential diagnosis. 
While testimony in the US trial on behalf of the mother indicated the strong 
possibility of multiple causation—for example, chronological links between 
periods of stress and gastroenterological problems, allergies being more severe 
at different times of the year and so on—the UK pediatrician is clearly of the 
mind that all symptoms (respiratory, gastroenterological, and other) should be 
explained by a single cause, namely, the mother’s MSbP behaviour. In the 
conclusion to her/his original report the pediatrician states that MSbP “is the 
unifying hypothesis in this case, i.e., it is the diagnosis that readily explains all 
the known facts.” The joint assumptions of mono-causality and that mono-
causality is preferable to multiple causation in complex cases are indicative of 
the kairotic rhetoric of fitness-to-situation. 
 The final assumption made by the pediatrician was of the validity and 
reliability of MSbP as a diagnostic category. While on the surface this might 
not seem unreasonable, it is important to note the rhetoric at play in this 
assumption. The role of the pediatrician was to help the court make its own 
impartial decision but by omitting any reference to the contested nature of the 
diagnosis (see above), the pediatric reports project only one part of the overall 
picture of MSbP—thus, perhaps, leading the court in one direction rather than 
another. This implicit signposting can be seen as kairotic rhetoric in that it 
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implicitly presents medical knowledge as scientific or objective rather than 




 Linked to kairos but more specific is what I shall term alignment. 
Whereas kairos is about fitness-to-situation within a wider cultural framework 
(see Segal, 2005), I use the term alignment to refer to the specific alignment 
between the pediatrician’s reports and the predispositions and interests of the 
Social Services. On a number of occasions, the Social Services had attempted 
to argue for estoppel on the grounds that the case had already been heard and 
decided upon in the US and all that was required in the UK was a decision on 
the disposal of the case, namely a decision about the future of the index child. 
This was the Social Services’ position from the outset and the pediatric report 
neatly fitted into that predisposition and neither the Social Services nor their 
legal team identified or raised any concerns about the quality of the pediatric 
reports or the conclusions therein. In other words, the pediatric report can be 
seen as persuasive because it aligned with what the Social Services already 
believed. 
 Similarly, the interests of the Social Services were not threatened by the 
pediatrician’s reports in that the reports of the social worker were taken at face 
value as being accurate and reliable, at least enough to repeat unquestioningly. 
Even when the misreporting of the fire was brought to the attention of the 
pediatrician, no comment was made about the social worker’s reporting.  
Indeed, the whole issue was glossed over in a single sentence, “The 
clarification of the reported fire was helpful.” In contrast, any perceived 
misreporting on the part of the mother was heavily criticised and this leads to 
the third feature of pathos, that of asymmetry in the stance taken to the evidence 




 Asymmetry is the process of treating differently the evidence and 
testimony of individuals based on who the individual is rather than on the 
application of consistent criteria for reliability and verification. Numerous 
examples of such asymmetry are to be found in the case of P,C,&S where the 
evidence and testimony of professionals was accepted at face value while that 
of the mother was questioned, viewed with suspicion, or simply dismissed. Two 
examples from the pediatric reports will suffice to illustrate. First, the 
pediatrician refers to the mother as having a “propensity to cast aspersions on 
the integrity of experts, without producing the evidence,” leading the reader to 
infer that such behaviour is suspicious or at least unfair. On the other hand, 
when the social worker made claims that the mother fabricated a report of a 




house fire and reported severe postnatal blood loss, these were accepted as 
reliable reports despite being unsubstantiated by evidence. This asymmetry in 
approach to the statements of the opposing parties is again rhetorical in that it 
implies the unreliability of one and the reliability of the other, an implication 
that serves the overall argument of the report that this is a case of MSbP. 
 A second asymmetry is apparent in the way that the pediatrician treated 
the US doctors’ reports as compared to her/his treatment of that of the mother. 
Although the pediatrician argued that there were discrepancies and 
inconsistencies in the mother’s reporting of symptoms (both her own and those 
of her children), the same attention to detail was not apparent when it came to 
the reporting of the US doctors. In preparing her case, the mother produced a 
list of approximately 80 occurrences of discrepancies, inconsistencies, and 
contradictions between reports and statements made at different times by the 
same doctor (not discrepancies between doctors). It is interesting to note that 
not one of these was commented upon by the pediatrician in her/his reports. 
Either s/he did not make note of these, or if s/he did, then was of the opinion 
that such discrepancies need not be included in her/his reports. In either case, 
there seems to have been an asymmetrical approach to the evidence in hand. 
This asymmetry fitted well with the approach of the Social Services in a 
number of ways. First, it supported their predisposition that this was a case of 
MSbP; second, it fitted well with their argument because it supported, rather 
than complicated, the case; and, third, it helped justify their decision to remove 
the index child at birth on the basis of the US evidence and to have this 




 In the above analysis I have attempted to illustrate the operation and 
impact of the rhetorical strategies of ethos and pathos as they are found in the 
ostensibly logos-driven arena of child protection proceedings in the UK. I have 
attempted to show how such strategies may strengthen the persuasiveness of the 
argument by drawing attention to the credibility, authority, worthiness, and 
intent of the author and by appeal to the predispositions of other parties, notably 
the Social Services and the court. While I have not addressed, here, the rhetoric 
of the argument of the reports—a task yet to be completed—I have tried to 
indicate how flaws in that rhetoric can be glossed over by applying the rhetoric 
of ethos or pathos. In so doing, we can see traces of the mobilization of bias 
within the court proceedings—a subject again for another day. 
 By providing such an analysis I hope to have demonstrated how an 
understanding of rhetoric can inform our evaluation of evidence and the 
operations of the UK domestic courts. By making explicit the rhetorical 
strategies employed by, in this case, the pediatrician, we are in a better position 
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to evaluate the complex picture and decide whether the Social Services and 
judge were correct in the claims that this was a case of MSbP and that the 
child’s interests were best served by removal from the birth family and 
placement with adoptive strangers. The above rhetorical analysis has also 
indicated how rhetoric operates by alignment with the predispositions and self-
interest of the audience—in this case, those of the Social Services and the court. 
This, in turn, suggests the need to foreground such predispositions and interests 
in order to subject these to critical evaluation, rather than leaving them 
unacknowledged and thus unexamined. In other words, rhetorical analysis 
allows us to explore and evaluate the interactions between author and audience, 
their respective intents, motivations, predispositions, and, perhaps, prejudices. 
If Twining’s view of the process of law is one that seems to invite our 
allegiance, then rhetorical analysis can help us properly to evaluate both 
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